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ABSTRACT

Ju, Jiayan, M. A., May 1998

Geography

Regional Economic Policy and Regional Income Inequality in
the People's Republic of China (105 pp.)
Director: Evan Denney
This study is a descriptive analysis of regional
development policies and their spatial outcomes in the
People's Republic of China.
It traces the history of
China's regional economic development, and investigates
regional income inequality in China by examining empirical
evidence.
Two distinctive regional economic policies are identified
associated with two time periods in history. The pro
interior regional economic policy pursued in the pre-reform
era (1949-1978) emphasized regional equality over economic
efficiency, and diverted massive amounts of industrial
investment to the interior provinces from the more
developed coastal region. The pro-coast regional economic
policy of the reform era (after 1978), on the contrary,
gave priority to economic efficiency over regional
equality, and concentrated state industrial investment in
the coastal provinces.
An examination of empirical evidence indicates that the
pro-interior regional economic policy did not bring about
improvements in provincial income inequality. Both
absolute and relative measures of provincial income
inequality increased during the pre-reform era.
Surprisingly, provincial income inequality decreased in the
early reform era until the early 1990s as a result of rapid
growth of the previously less developed provinces in the
coastal region and slow growth of the industrially more
developed provinces. However, a widening of regional
income gap is inevitable given the pro-coast regional
economic policy and it will remain a long-term phenomenon
in China.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background
In 1949 the government of the People's Republic of
China inherited an economy in which most of the economically
developed areas were concentrated on the eastern coast and
in large cities.

This pattern of uneven regional

development was incompatible with the socialist ideology of
equality among people, classes and regions.

The Chinese

leadership took it upon themselves to eliminate the three
big differences: the difference between industrial workers
and peasants; the difference between urban and rural areas;
and the difference between manual and mental work.

In order

to reduce regional economic inequalities, the Chinese
government devised a new regional economic policy that
diverted resources from the coast to the interior.

During

the First Five-Year-Plan (1953-1957), two-thirds of the
major industrial projects and more than one-half of total
1

2

industrial investment were located in the interior (Kirkby
1985, 138) .
The Vietnam War and the worsening relationships with
the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1960s made the
Chinese government extremely sensitive to the possibility of
a "Third World War".

National defense emerged as a priority

in China’s regional economic policy.

Avoiding the

vulnerable large coastal cities (First Front) and their
adjacent areas (Second Front), the construction of Third
Front projects in remote sites of China was carried out from
the early 1960s and to the mid-1970s. Investment was
diverted to the construction of industries, especially large
capital projects such as iron and steel and military
machinery, in interior locations that were less vulnerable
to foreign attacks.

These Third Front industrial projects

tended to be located in "shan, san, dong" sites, which means
"in mountains, in dispersion, in caves".
Thus, regional economic policy during the three decades
after Liberation in 1949 was largely driven by egalitarian
ideology and defense concern.

Whether the policy decreased

regional inequalities of economic development is
controversial.

Some studies conclude that the pattern of

uneven regional economic development, caused by the
establishment of the treaty ports at the end of the Qing

3

Dynasty, was completely corrected by the end of the three
decades after Liberation (Li 1992, 50, 53).

Other studies

argue that uneven regional economic development did not
change significantly during this period despite spatially
biased investment policy.

Some decline in interprovincial

inequalities occurred during the 1960s (Lardy 1980; Riskin
1987), but this trend did not continue. Substantial inter
provincial inequalities remained in the 1970s and 1980s
(Paine 1981; Lyons 1991; Tsui 1991).
Regional economic development policy during Mao
Zedong's time seems to have achieved some degree of regional
economic equality although at the expense of efficiency
(Yang 1990, 240). After thirty years of biased regional
economic policy, the coastal region still produced about 60
percent of China's industrial output (Zen and Liang 1994,
16).

The failure of this regional economic policy in

bringing about national economic growth has been widely
criticized (Zhang 1989, 71), especially the Third Front
program.

According to Barry Naughton, China's industrial

output is 10 to 15 percent below what it would have been if
the Third Front program had never been undertaken (Naughton
1988, 379).
Since the rise of China's paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping at the end of 1978, and with the introduction of
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the reform and open-door policy, fundamental changes have
occurred in China's regional economic development philosophy
and policy.

The new regional economic development policy,

emphasizing efficiency over equality, has encouraged
economic growth in coastal regions, expected and tolerated
uneven regional economic development in the hope that growth
would eventually diffuse to the interior.
Western regional economic development theories have
greatly influenced the development philosophy of the reform
era.

These include the notion of Cumulative-Circular

Causation (Myrdal 1957), Growth Pole Theory (Hirschman 1958,
183-201), the Inverted-U Model (Williamson 1965), and the
Core-Periphery Model

(Friedmann 1966, 60-101).

These models

are discussed in Chapter Two.
The Three-Economic-Region Model was the blueprint for
Chinese regional economic policy during the 1980s (Figure
1).

The sixth Five-Year-Plan (1981-1985) first proposed the

division of the country into three large regions for
purposes of economic development, namely, the Eastern,
Central, and Western Regions.

The Seventh Five-Year-Plan

(1986-1990) officially adopted this model.

The model is

based on the concepts of comparative advantage and regional
division of labor: the Eastern region would specialize in
export-oriented industries and foreign trade; the Central

Heilongjiang

CENTRAL
REGION Beijins
Xinjiang

Inner Mongolia
Nmgxia

wTianjm

Hebei

WESTERN
REGION

EASTERN
REGION
Jiangsu

Shandong
Qinghai
Gansu
Shaanxi \

Henan
Shanghai
A nhui

Sichuan

Z hejiang

Jiangxi
Hunan
Gui2hou

□ Fourteen open coastal cities
A Special economic zones
Various open economic zones:
the golden coastline

Yunnan

Guangxi

Guartgdon

0
Hainan

Figure 1. The three economic regions, open coastal cities, and open economic zones of China. Source: Fan 1997,624,
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Region in agriculture and energy; and the Western Region in
animal husbandry and mineral exploitation (Beijing Review
1986a; 1986b).

Foreign trade and industrialization in the

Eastern Region is expected to initiate national economic
growth, and this growth is expected to diffuse to the
Central and Western Regions given time.

Yet the mechanisms

for bringing about diffusion have hardly been discussed in
the literature.
The Ladder-Step Theory has been an important guide for
regional economic policy makers in the reform era.

This

theory gives the Eastern Region priority of development.
It maintains that, over time, economic growth will diffuse
from the coast to the interior in a way like descending the
steps of a ladder (Yang 1990, 244-246).
Export-led growth in the Eastern Region has been
greatly facilitated by the establishment of various open
zones along the coast (Figure 1).

These include the five

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou,
and Xiamen designated in 1979, and Hainan in 1988.

In

addition, fourteen Open Coastal Cities (OCCs) were
designated in 1984.

Various other open zones were selected

including the three Coastal Economic Development Zones
(CEDZS) of the Yangtze, Pearl, and Min River deltas.

These
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open zones enjoy various preferential policies from the
state, and foreign investors were given special treatment,
such as, tax exemptions, and import duty reductions.

To

promote these zones, the state allocated large investments
to improve their infrastructure.

As state and foreign

investments boosted economic growth, these zones became
China's "golden coastline", a popular term that first
appeared in People's Daily, overseas edition, dated Jan.
22, 1992.
Given the regional economic policy of the reform era
and the regional economic development theories on which it
is based, one would expect an increase in regional economic
inequalities in China.

There seems to be a consensus of

opinion that regional economic inequalities decreased
during the thirty years after Liberation in 1949, and that
they have been increasing since the implementation of the
reform and open-door policy at the end of 1978.

Yet

empirical studies regarding regional economic inequalities
in China have reported mixed results.

Some studies report

a decline (Yang 1992; Zen and Liang 1994), others an
increase (Chen et al. 1993).
The issue of regional economic inequalities in China
is a complicated one.

The above consensus is over

simplistic. The extent of regional economic inequalities
depends on which regional unit is examined.

Regional

economic inequalities could be the disparities between the
three economic regions, between the provinces, or between
the counties within a province.

Most studies agree that

since reform there has been a widening of development gap
between the coast and the interior.

But when it comes down

to provincial or county level, the story is more complex
and worth our attention.

Statement of Purpose and Methodology
The primary goal of this study is to examine some
aspects of the regional economic development in China since
1949.

This study utilizes an extensive library search for

literature in both English and Chinese.

Much of the

research focuses on regional economic development
literature and, to a significant extent, on regional
economic development models.

One of the difficulties in

studying aspects of China is acquisition of data.

This

necessitated substantial use of the interlibrary loan
opportunities at the University of Montana.
Chinese studies in general often lack a regional
dimension.

Though regional economic policy is only one
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component in the package for China's national development,
its importance has not always been appreciated.

There are

fifty-six ethnic groups in China, and most of the minority
groups live in the poorer interior regions.

Regional

economic policy must cater to a variety of ethnic and
interest groups so as not to cause social instability and
conflicts between regions, a prerequisite for a healthy
national economy.
In the course of a nation's economic development,
there seem to be tradeoffs between growth and equality.

In

China's case, there has long been a set of conflicts over
regional economic policy.

The controversial question is:

should there be regional economic specialization based on
comparative advantage, which would allow faster economic
growth in the more efficient coastal region, or, should
there be a more equitable regional economic policy even if
it is not as efficient?
In order to answer this question, an examination of
China's regional development history is indispensable.
From the time the People's Republic of China was founded to
the current day, two distinctive regional policies can be
identified.
history.

They are associated with two time periods in

In this study the two time periods are called the
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"pre-reform era" (1949-1978) and the "reform era" (after
1978), with the rise of Deng Xiaoping and his reform policy
in 1978 as the demarcation line.

Emphasizing

egalitarianism and national defense, the pro-interior
regional economic policy pursued in the pre-reform era
diverted massive flows of industrial investment to the
interior provinces from the more developed coastal regions.
The pro-coast regional economic policy of the reform era,
however, concentrated state industrial investment in the
coastal provinces, placing more importance on efficiency
than on equality.
To evaluate spatial impacts of the above two policies,
a collection and review of empirical evidence is a critical
next step.

The questions that have to be answered at this

stage of the research are: 1) Did the pro-interior regional
economic policy of the pre-reform era succeed in narrowing
regional economic inequalities?

2) Has the pro-coast

regional economic policy of the reform era increased
regional economic inequalities?

The absence of evidence

showing significant reduction in regional inequalities in
the pre-reform era would discredit the pro-interior
regional economic policy, and the presence of such evidence
would give credit to the policy.

An increase in regional

11

economic inequalities in the reform era was expected.

An

examination of empirical evidence will suggest if reality
corresponds with the expectation.
To summarize, this research is a descriptive analysis
of regional economic development policies and their spatial
outcomes in the People's Republic of China since 1949.

It

traces the history of regional economic development in
China, and analyzes the spatial impacts of Chinese regional
economic policies by examining empirical evidence.

As a

citizen of China, I hope to provide the reader with a
treatise regarding China's regional economic development
and planning, so as to assist in a better understanding of
the most populous nation in the world.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theories of Regional Economic Development
The 1960s saw a proliferation of regional development
theories in the West, some of which served as theoretical
justification for the regional economic development
philosophy of the reform era.

These include the notion of

Circular and Cumulative Causation (Myrdal 1957), Growth Pole
Theory (Hirschman 1958, 183-201) , the Inverted-U Model
(Williamson 1965), and the Center-Periphery Model (Friedmann
1966, 60-101).
The birth of regional development as a field of study
is often dated as 1958, corresponding with the publication
of Gunnar Myrdal's Economic Theory and Underdeveloped
Regions in 1957, and Albert Hirschman's The Strategy of
Economic Development in 1958 (Malecki 1991, 25).
Gunnar Myrdal's (Myrdal 1957) Circular and Cumulative
Causation Model is a model of unbalanced growth.
12

It
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suggests that if a region gains some initial economic
advantage, new growth and the benefits of multiplier effects
will tend to concentrate in this already expanding region,
rather than in other regions. Growth becomes self
reinforcing with strong endogenous forces tending to
increase regional differentials in productivity growth,
which may persist for a long time.

Regarding the spread

effects (the ability of the expanding region to radiate its
growth outward into the surrounding space), Myrdal thinks
that "the higher the level of economic development that a
country has already attained the stronger the spread effects
will usually be (Myrdal 1957, 34)".
The modern development of the Growth Pole Theory is
attributed to a French economist, F. Perroux, who believed
that "growth does not appear everywhere and all at once; it
appears in points or development poles, with variable
intensities; it spreads along diverse channels and with
varying terminal effects to the whole of the economy
(Glasson 1975, 145)".

J. Boudeville, another French

economist, defines a regional growth pole as a "set of
expanding industries located in an urban area and inducing
further development of economic activity throughout its zone
of influence (Glasson 1975, 145).

Albert Hirschman

(Hirschman 1958), Gunnar Myrdal (Myrdal 1957), and Harry
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Richardson (Richardson 197 6) further refined and developed
the basic concepts of Growth Pole Theory.
Albert Hirschman believes that development often begins
with the sudden, vigorous, and nearly spontaneous growth of
one or a few regions or urban centers.

Therefore, "whatever

the reason, there can be little doubt that an economy, to
lift itself to higher income

levels, must and will first

develop within itself one or several regional centers of
economic strength" (Hirschman 1958, 183).
Regarding the interplay of polarization effects (the
ability of leading industries to attract other economic
units into the growth pole) and spread effects, Hirschman
contends that if the pole region had to rely to an important
degree on products from the peripheral region for its own
expansion, the trickling-down or spread effects would gain
the upper hand over the polarization effects.

But if the

functioning of market forces results in a temporary victory
of the polarization effects, deliberate economic policy will
be employed to correct the situation.

He believes that

economic policy should be an important influence throughout
the process of regional economic development.
Hirschman suggests a strategy of phasing the investment
process over regions, concentrating initially upon the
points of rapid urban-industrial expansion, and then moving
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outward into the periphery.

Although public investment

policy may cause substantial regional disparity at one
stage, such a situation will not persist in the long run
because of government's concern over equality and national
cohesion.
Jeffrey Williamson's Inverted-U Model (Williamson 1965)
describes an expected pattern of regional economic growth
with an initial divergence followed by convergence during
the course of economic development.

He presents a

hypothesis that the early stages of national development
would generate increasingly large regional income
differentials.

Somewhere during the course of development,

some or all of the disequilibrating tendencies diminish,
causing a reversal in the pattern of interregional
inequality, with the backward regions closing the
development gap between themselves and the already
industrialized areas.

According to Williamson, "the

expected result is that a statistic describing regional
inequality will trace out an inverted 'U' over the national
growth path; the historical timing of the peak level of
spatial income differentials is left somewhat vague and may
vary considerably with the resource endowment and
institutional environment of each developing nation
(Williamson 1965, 10)."

Based on his empirical study, he
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concludes that "rising regional income disparities and
increasing North-South dualism [the coexistence of wealthy
and poor regions in a country, with North being wealthy
regions, and South poor regions] is typical of early
development stages, while regional convergence and a
disappearance of severe North-South problems is typical of
the more mature stages of national growth and development
(Williamson 1965, 64)".
The spatial structure of economies that are in
transition to industrialism is best described by a CenterPeriphery Model.

John Friedmann states that "a powerful

central region reduces the rest of the space economy to the
role of a tributary area that is drained of its resources,
manpower, and capital (Friedmann 1966, 99)."

The Center-

Periphery Model is a spatial disequilibrium model.
According to Friedmann, "this disequilibrium is a structural
one.

As a result, the automatic working of the market does

not reestablish a spatial equilibrium but reinforces the
initial structural imbalance.

Even when equilibrating

tendencies persist, a balanced interregional system may
require several generations to come into existence
(Friedmann 1966, 99)."

Friedmann contends that a continuing

center-periphery relation is harmful to a country, and that
regional economic policy seeks to influence economic

17

activity by guiding public investments.

Core regions

perform a critical role in generating impulses of economic
development and transmitting them to the periphery of the
space economy.

According to Friedmann, "national economic

development is, to a large extent, identical with the
development of core regions.

From one fourth to one third

of national investment may be spent there, and for good
reason. For core regions perform a critical role in the
process of industrialization and are major centers for
trade, finance, and government activities (Friedmann 1966,
66) ."

The above four development theories all agree to the
following: 1) Growth begins in a few growth poles or growth
centers. 2) At the early stages of development, polarization
effects are stronger than spread effects because of the
benefit of an agglomeration economy, which causes regional
income inequality to rise.

3) In the long run, growth will

spread from the center to the periphery, reducing regional
income disparity. 4) Regional economic policy influences
regional economic development by guiding public investment.
The above, so-called "stages-of-development" models,
greatly influenced regional economic development policy of
the reform era.

From the standpoint of these models, China,

being a developing country, is at an early stage in the
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economic development process.

Therefore, an increase in

regional economic inequalities is inevitable in the short
term. These models served to legitimize the new Chinese
regional economic policy aimed at achieving efficiency at
the expense of equality through national investment in
state-selected growth poles along the coast of China.

Based

on these models as well as classical theories of economic
development, China's new regional economic policy emphasized
comparative advantage, regional specialization, and division
of labor.

As a result, a variety of new regional economic

development models emerged.

Two new models of Chinese

regional economic development, the Three-Economic-Region
Model, and the Ladder-Step Theory, will be discussed in
Chapter Four.
Previous Studies
There is a large body of literature regarding regional
economic development in China.

For Chinese studies in

general, it is said that one should look for archival
sources in the West, do field work in China, receive
language training in Taiwan, and enjoy research
opportunities in Hong Kong.

The following literature review

is from both Western (American and British) and Chinese
(mainland and Hong Kong) sources.

It is reviewed in the
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alphabetic order of the authors' last names.
Kam Wing Chan (Chan 1992) studies the urbanization
policies of the pre-reform era.

He finds that China was

highly effective in simultaneously fostering rapid
industrial growth and slowing urban growth.

This "anti

urbanism" or "industrialization without urbanization" was
achieved through mass urban population removal to the
countryside, strict bans on urban in-migration, suppression
of the expansion of urban service employment and personal
consumption in general, and promotion of rural
industrialization. These "anti-urban" measures were seen as
the logical results of Mao Zedong's scheme to promote
greater rural-urban balance.

Yet according to Chan, most of

these measures are arguably "urban-biased" and they tend to
reinforce urban-rural disparities and protect existing
privileges of the urbanites.
Cindy Fan (Fan 1995b) describes and analyzes the
patterns of and changes in uneven regional development at
three different regional levels: a study of interprovincial
income inequality, a study of intraprovincial inequality for
five provinces, and a detailed case study of Guangdong
Province. She concludes that the reduction in
interprovincial income inequality in China since 1978 is the
result of rapid growth in previously less developed eastern
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provinces (Guangdong and Fujian), and slow growth in
previously more developed regions (the three municipalities
of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and the three
northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and
Liaoning).

She also points out that interprovincial

analysis is not adequate for explaining uneven regional
economic development in China. At the county level, the
story is more complex.

Her case study of five provinces

provides some evidence of the diffusion of growth from
Shanghai to neighboring areas, while Guangdong moved in the
direction of growth polarization.
Her other paper (Fan 1995a) offers an explanation for
Guangdong Province's growth polarization in comparison with
a more balanced growth pattern in Jiangsu Province.

Her

empirical analysis of the data for the 1980s indicate that
spatial income inequality in Jiangsu Province has declined
a.s a result of local investment in township and village
enterprises.

This is called development from below (DFB).

Guangdong, on the other hand, has seen an escalation of
spatial income inequality and a concentration of economic
growth in the Pearl River Delta area, which is strongly
related to state investment and foreign investment.

This is

called development from above and development from outside
(DFA and DFO).

These findings support her hypothesis that

21
DFA and DFO tend to increase spatial income inequality,
while DFB is accompanied by a more balanced spatial economic
development pattern.
Nicholas Lardy's work (Lardy 1980) was the first to
provide a detailed and systematic account of China's
regional economic inequalities.

He concludes that regional

income inequality was reduced over time during the pre
reform era.

He calculated population-weighted coefficients

of variation for 1952, 1957 and 1974 based on industrial
output data.

His index shows a declining trend over time.

Li Si-Ming (Li 1996) explains why there is a
fundamental paradox in China's regional economic development
in the reform era.

At the provincial level, regional income

gaps surprisingly narrowed in the 1980s when the pro-coast
regional economic policy was implemented.

One explanation

Li offers for the existence of this paradox is the relative
slow growth of the thtee municipalities and the three
northeastern provinces and the rapid growth of originally
less developed Eastern provinces.
Li Wen-Yan (Li 1990) points out that the Great Leap
Forward (explained in Chapter 3) from 1958 to 1960 and the
Third Front construction from the early 19 60s through the
mid-197 0s had serious negative effects despite some positive
results.

According to Li, "neither nationwide high growth
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rate nor a more even spatial distribution of heavy industry
was realized (Li 1990, 6 3 ) The Third Front program "did
to some extent promote the economic development of the
inland provinces but the result was not as large as expected
and was gained at the expense of nationwide economic growth
(Li 1990, 63)
Li Zhengquan (Li 1992) holds an orthodox Chinese
opinion that the first thirty years of China's development
resulted in a more evenly spread industrial distribution.
Yet he criticizes the Third Front program, and admits that
equality was achieved at the expense of efficiency.
Thomas Lyons (Lyons 1991) examines regional economic
growth and interregional economic disparities in China from
1952 to 1987, and finds that every province experienced
substantial real growth over this period.

The provinces,

however, differed quite widely in terms of overall growth
rates and rates of industrialization.

According to Lyons,

"in general, the less-developed provinces did not narrow the
absolute gaps between themselves and those that were ahead
in the 1950s (Lyons 1991, 498)."

He concludes that "China's

experience since the 1950s has been quite respectable; at
least in term of regional disparities, it does not
constitute a clear triumph of inequality (Lyons 1991, 499)."
However, the absolute gaps between richest and poorest
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provinces widened considerably between the 1950s and the
mid-1980s.
Barry Naughton (Naughton 1988) describes the origin,
development and legacy of the Third Front program.

He

argues that the Third Front greatly increased the costs of
industrialization by shifting construction to substantially
more remote locations in the interior.

According to

Naughton, "China's annual industrial output is currently 1015 percent below what it would have been if the Third Front
had never been undertaken, and that investment had been used
in other inland locations (Naughton 1988, 379)."

Moreover,

the Third Front reduced the efficiency of investment in
First and Second Front areas as well, which added to its
cost.
Suzanne Paine (Paine 1981) studies the time period from
1949 to 1979, and finds that certain key spatial
inequalities in China have narrowed over this period as a
whole, although progress has been uneven.
Carl Riskin (Riskin 1987) looks into income
distribution from 1957 to 1979 at five scales:
interregional, inter-local, urban-rural, personal and inter
class.

Regarding interregional income disparity, he finds

that all of the relative measures of inequality (for
example, the coefficient of variation) were either declining
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over the period or at least remaining constant.

The

absolute difference in yuan (Chinese currency) between the
highest and the lowest per capita provincial industrial
output widened considerably from 1957 to 1979.

Based on

different findings at different scales, he concludes that no
simple conclusion about the degree of equality achieved can
be drawn.

According to Riskin, "perhaps the least

complicated and most significant general conclusion" is
"that China's poor emerged from the Maoist era significantly
better off than the poor of most other developing countries.
But poverty remained...(Riskin 1987,250)."
Kai Yuen Tsui (Tsui 1991) explores the change in
regional economic inequality in China from 1952 to 1985.
His empirical study suggests that interprovincial income
gaps did not narrow between 1952 and 1985. Regional income
inequality definitely increased since 1970 because the
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor provinces
by the central government was not significant enough to
reduce inequality over the long run.
Yang Dali (Yang 1990) compares and contrasts China's
approaches to regional industrial development in the pre
reform era and reform era.

Yang argues that the pre-reform

regional policies combined features of a Soviet-style
development strategy with Mao's ideas of egalitarianism and
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self-reliance, but "ended in the worst of both worlds (Yang
1990, 240)."

These policies seem to have achieved some

degree of regional equality, albeit at the expense of
efficiency, because the national economy would have grown
faster if investment had been made in terms of efficiency.
In the reform era, the central government has favored the
coastal region through state investment and preferential
policies.

Since efficiency was emphasized over equality in

the reform era, "regional growth has been and will continue
to be uneven and the gap between the regions will perhaps
widen at an accelerating rate (Yang 1990, 250)."
Zen Juxing and Liang Bin (Zen and Liang 1994) argue
that the regional development process in China does not
follow Williamson's Inverted-U Model.

Instead, an "M" model

and a "W" model are suggested for interprovincial income
disparity and the disparity between the three economic
regions respectively.

Zen and Liang predict that regional

gap in economic development will continue to enlarge in the
future.
Zhang Shuguang (Zhang 1993) points out that regional
income inequalities measured by Net Material Product (NMP)
and by National Income Utilized (NIU) tell different
stories.

NMP refers to the nominal gross value of output

minus nominal material consumption, and NIU is the sum of
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public and private consumption plus saving.

The difference

between the two may be regarded as government transfers,
which, for example, would normally be negative for Shanghai,
reflecting a net outflow of resources, and positive for
Tibet, reflecting a net inflow of resources.

During 1952-

1978, regional income inequality measured by NIU per capita
was apparently decreasing, while that measured by NMP per
capita was increasing, reflecting an increasing gap in
regional production efficiency.

During 1979-1990, however,

the central government limited its role in income
redistribution.

As a result, regional income disparity

measured by NMP decreased between provinces and the three
economic regions, while that measured by NIU obviously
increased, suggesting an enlarging regional income gap.

CHAPTER THREE.
PRE-REFORM ERA,. 1949-1978
A Command Economy
The Chinese economic system in the pre-reform., era
(1949-1978) was a- variant of the- Soviet-style command
economy-.- Command- economies share- two- basic characteristics.First,, resource allocation decisions are made in response to
commands from- central planners- rather than- in response to
markets.-

Second-,- a- large- volume- of resources- is

concentrated- in the hands- of central planners-,- who
redistribute resources into selected investment programs
(Naughton 1996,- 26-) -.- Command economies are-also- calledcentrally- planned- economies.
The- Chinese command- economy was not- an identical twinof the Soviet command economy.

In fact, China did not

follow-the Soviet model- closely-except- for- the First F-i-v-eYear-Plan (1953-1957). .

China and the Soviet Union had

different factor endowments.

In addi tion,- China-had -a much 27
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larger rural population, and was much poorer than the Soviet
Union. Consequently, the Chinese planning system was less
centralized than that of the Soviet Union.
The development strategy of the Chinese command economy
was designed to achieve maximum growth of industrial and
military capacity as rapidly as possible.

A massive flow of

investment was directed into capital-intensive productive
facilities and concentrated in the goods-producing sector.
This development strategy attempted to maximize growth of
industry at the expense of development in other areas, for
example, agriculture and social services.

Basic health and

education were widely provided at an early stage of
development, but provision of high-level services, for
example, higher education, sophisticated medical services,
etc., was subsequently neglected.

This heavy-industry

centered strategy was incompatible with China's factor
endowment.

Unlike the Soviet Union, China was rich in

manpower, but desperately short of capital and productive
land.

A development strategy focusing on labor-intensive

industries would have been more appropriate to China's
factor endowment.

But the Chinese leadership adopted a

Soviet-style development strategy, partly because of the
prestige of the Soviet Union in the socialist world and
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partly because of their own great power aspirations
(Naughton 1996, 28).
Under the Chinese command economy the government had
direct control over raw material flows, manpower, and money.
Public ownership, in the form of state ownership of largescale industry and commerce and collective ownership of
agricultural production units, guaranteed state control of
resources.

A planning device was set up to direct resources

to central planners' priority uses.
Since the objective of pumping resources into heavy and
military industries was most important, a redistribution
system was extremely desirable for the Chinese command
economy.

The redistribution system had a unique set of

macroeconomic characteristics.

First, the government share

of national income was large, while the household share of
national income modest.

Households controlled only 55

percent of disposable national income in China in 1978
(Naughton 1996, 31).

Second, household saving was small,

and the bulk of national saving was carried out by stateowned enterprises. Third, state investments were mostly
financed by transferring state enterprise revenue to the
budget.

The taxation system was not explicitly developed,

but was rather implicit in the price system controlled by
the government.

Fourth, bank lending was restricted to
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short-term finance of trade and inventories.

Fifth,

shortages and lengthy queues for consumer goods were a
common scene at the time.

These shortages were mainly

caused by the government channeling so many resources into
heavy and military industries that there was little left for
households.

(Naughton 1996, 31-33).
Major Changes in Economic Policies

Although the command economy was consistently pursued
during the pre-reform era, this time period did not lack
policy shifts in development approaches.

The pre-reform era

can be divided into at least five major subperiods with
different problems, goals, strategies and policies.

They

are the Period of Reconstruction, the First Five-Year-Plan,
the Great Leap Forward, the Period of Depression,
Readjustment, and Recovery, and the Cultural Revolution.
According to Barry Naughton, "the Chinese government, like
governments everywhere, made vital economic decisions with
inadequate information, often in near-crisis situations, and
subject to numerous economic and non-economic constraints
(Naughton 1996, 23)."

Therefore, Naughton views Chinese

policymakers as lacking rationality.

During the pre-reform

era, the Chinese pursued quite different strategies at
different subperiods.

Some of Beijing's policy changes were

the result of a natural process of trial and error; others,
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however, were the result of serious differences within the
Chinese leadership (Barnett 1976, 1).
The Period of Reconstruction, 1949-1952
In 1949, when the People's Republic of China was
founded, the new government inherited a badly disrupted,
imbalanced and underdeveloped economy.

Their initial

objective was simply to restore agricultural and industrial
production to some sembalance of normal levels.

The first

three years were a period of recovery and reconstruction
from a war-torn economy.

China's new leadership was able to

achieve their basic recovery goals with remarkable speed and
success. The existing nationwide transportation and
communications facilities were reopened.

Inflation was

quickly brought under control, and fiscal and monetary
stability was restored. According to A. Doak Barnett,
production in both the cities and the countryside reached
past peak levels in many.major sectors by 1952 (Barnett
1976, 2).
The First Five-Year-Plan, 1953-1957
China's First Five-Year-Plan was closely modeled on the
Soviet approach.

The plan gave clear priority to industry

over agriculture, to heavy capital-goods industries over
light consumer-goods industries, and to capital-intensive
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enterprises over labor-intensive enterprises.

The First

Five-Year-plan's investment in agriculture was only 8
percent against 40 percent in industry, 11 percent in
transportation, and 18 percent in public health, culture and
education (Farina 1980, 488).

Greater emphasis was placed

on urban than on rural development.
The First Five-Year-Plan regarded the concentration of
Chinese industry in the coastal regions and in a few big
cities as unfavorable, both to the economy and to defense.
Its regional policies were aimed at dispersing industry to
the interior and finally at overcoming regional inequalities
between industrialized and non-industrialized provinces.
Inland provinces, the source of only 27 percent of
industrial output in 1952, received 55 percent of national
industrial investment during the first three years of the
First Five-Year-Plan (Lardy 1980, 174) .

Among the 694 major

industrial projects of the Plan, 472 (68 percent) were
situated in the interior provinces (Farina 1980, 485-486).
These projects were concentrated in so-called "key cities"
rather than evenly spread in the interior.

During the First

Five-Year-Plan, eighteen key cities were selected as
recipients of enormous investment funds for both
infrastructure and industrial development.
were large cities in the interior.

Most of them

Two hundred complete
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plant projects were constructed with the assistance of the
Soviet Union and some- Eastern European countries.-

These-

projects formed the core of the First Five-Year-Plan, and
were heavily concentrated in key cities (Lardy 198-0, 176)-.
In many respects, the First Five-Year-Plan was a great
success.

A highly centralized system of economic planning

was established.

The Plan initiated a rapid growth rate of

6 to- 8- percent annually (Barnett 197 6, 3)-.

In only a few

years, the Chinese built a- new and much more diverse
industrial base than it had had- before.
However, the economic problems that had become apparent
at the end of the First Five-Year-Plan were numerous-.
Agricultural output was lagging badly.

Continuing

population growth- and internal migration from the
countryside to the cities resulted in rapid urbanization and
growing unemployment in the- cities.

Mao Zedong and other

Chinese leaders became increasingly disturbed by what they
saw as the- undesirable- political and social eonsegu-ence-s- o-f
following the Soviet model.

China's Soviet-style planning

system, encountered many difficulties, which created seriousdoubts about the degree o-f centralization.

In 1957, a

fairly extensive- program- o-f fiscal decentralization wa-sadopted.

The Chinese government meant to solve the

unemployment problem- during the- First Plan- period, but it
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failed- and was- compelled to delay this task to the next
plan.
The- Great- Leap Forward,- 1958-1960
After the. completion of the- socialist transformation of
industry, agriculture and commerce in 1957, the Chinese
leadership, especially Mao Zedong, decided to abandon the
Soviet- model, and to adopt- a new deve-lopment- strategy,

In

order to solve- the problems that- appeared during the- First
Five-Year-Plan, Beij.ing decided to "walk on two legs", that
is-, to- spur growth in both agriculture- and industry, and in
both large-seal e and- sma-11-scale- industry, using both modern
and indigenous- methods-.
Forward.

This- became- known as the- Great- Leap

The policies of the Great Leap Forward included

People's- Communes, fiscal decentralization, and the
establishment- of small local industries.

The- Maois-t-

concepts of radical egalitarianism and self-reliance- was
emphasized during, this period.
The- Great- Leap Forward and the Commune programrepresented radical at-tempt-s to solve real problems.

They

were intended to provide more economic opportunity
throughout rural China.

Barnett stated it well when he

wrote, "the regime attempted to do too much, too fast, by
untested methods; and on balance the effort was a failure
(Barnett 1976, 4)

The planning and statistical system
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broke down. The nation's transport system and economy as a
whole were badly disrupted.

The Communes proved to be

unworkable,- so did many of the small local industries, such
as the so-called "backyard steel furnaces".

According to

James Grant, "the effort created some jobs, but only at the
cost of a lower quality and higher-cost product (Grant 1973,
15)",
Given the problems and policies of the Great Leap
Forward and the three subsequent years of bad weather, a
famine occurred during 1959-1961 when thirty million peoplestarved or died from disease.

Moreover, Moscow's withdrawal

of all of its technicians and economic aid from China in
1960 crippled many Chinese industries.
Depression, Readjustment-, and Recovery, 1961-1965
The Great Leap Forward was followed by a socialist
equivalent- of an economic depression.

It was not only

economic stagnation but retrogression as well.

Agricultural

output dropped drastically followed by industrial
production. Table 1 shows that per capita NMP growth rates
dropped to about 3 percent for the Eastern, Central, and
Western Regions,

Malnutrition was widespread, and morale

was extremely low.
To cope with the depression and to stimulate recovery,
a new development strategy was implemented, focusing on
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Table 1
Growth Rates of Net Material Product3 Per Capita (%)
Eastern
Region
7.12
2.94

Central
Region
6.96
3.12

First FYPC (1953-1957)
Great Leap Forward and
Readjustment (1958-1965)
Third FYPb (1966-1970)
4.08
3.16
Fourth FYPb (1971-1975)
4.79
2.44
Source: Li 1996, 26.
a Net material product is a surrogate for income.
b FYp refers to Five-Year-■Plan.

immediate problems of economic survival.

Western
Region
10.82
3.72
0.-79
2.67

Some of the

policies during this period represented compromise between
the approaches of the First Five-Year-Plan and those of the
Great Leap Forward, but other policies involved major
changes in the state's priorities,

For the first time, top

priority was assigned to agriculture.

Light industry was

given second priority, and heave industry, third.

The

military industry, however, continued to receive relatively
high priority, Although the Chinese continued to stress
self-reliance because of the Sino-Soviet split, foreign
trade was expanded with non-socialist countries rather than
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The new policies stimulated recovery and renewed
growth, China's agricultural production began to turn upward
after the depression, followed by industrial and overall
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national output-

This upward course continued until 1966

(Barnett 1976, 5).
The famine forced many to move to the cities in search
of better living conditions.

In the cities, food supply

became difficult and the continuous population increase made
the housing situation even worse.

One of the principal aims

of this period was removal of rural people from cities to
countryside.
The Cultural Revolution, 1966-197 6
The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 197 6 is described
by the Chinese as "ten years of catastrophe".

It was

initiated by Mao Zedong to "revolutionize" China's
"superstructure" in order to reform China's "culture"
(i.e., the education system, the arts, etc.). In the realm
of economic policies, the Cultural Revolution "represented
an attempt to reemphasize the kind of revolutionary values
that had motivated the Great Leap Forward (Barnett 197 6,
6)".

It should be pointed out though, that the Great Leap

Forward was predominantly an economic movement, whereas the
Cultural Revolution a political and cultural movement.
Egalitarian values and revolutionary social change were
reasserted instead of order, efficiency, or economic growth.
The years 1966, 1967, and 1968 were referred to as the
"three bad years", when disruptions of the economy were

greater than the latter part of the Cultural Revolution,
Per capita NMP growth rates remained low (Table 1).

The

widespread political turmoil and the breakdown of authority
led to a significant drop in production.

To cope with the

ever-increasing urban population and to achieve the goals of
socialist education, the state council organized a massive
campaign to resettle urban youth (almost exclusively middle
school graduates) to rural areas.

From 1966 to 1977, 17

million young people left the cities for the countryside.
(Farina 1980,- 496) .

These teenagers were

"removed from

their social environment, alien to the peasant world,
overwhelmed by hard work and psychologically depressed
(Farina 1980, 496)". This mass migration, known as the
"Shang Shan Xia Xiang" (up to the mountains and down to the
country) movement, had serious social consequences and
constituted a tragedy for a whole generation of people.
After the three bad years of the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1968), order was gradually resumed and production
began to increase.

Economic policies after 1968 were

similar to the policies of the 1963-1965 readjustment
period. Agriculture remained the top priority. Foreign trade
expanded.

In fact, China imported foreign technology and

even entire plants from non-socialist countries on a larger
scale than ever before.

Military procurement was greatly
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cut back starting in 1972- after American President Richard
Nixon's visit to China.
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a wave of statesupported rural industrialization.

Policy at that time-

encouraged the establishment of "five small" rural
industries; iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer,
hydroelectric power and farm implements.

From a very low

base, rural industrial output grew rapidly through the
1970s.

Between 197 0 and 197 8, rural industrial employment

grew 2-0 percent annually (Naughton 1996, 146), employing
about 17 million people (Farina 1980, 499).

Suzanne Paine

reports that 29 million people, were employed in rural
industries, which represented 9.4 percent of total rural
labor force (Paine 1981, 155).

However, rural industrial

output was surprisingly unimportant on the eve of reform.
Of China's total industrial output in 1978, only 9 percent
was produced in rural areas (Naughton 1996, 144).

Thus, the

sector's direct contribution to national industrial output
was much less significant than its contribution to
employment.
Third Front
From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, there was an
extraordinary episode occurring in China's regional economic
development history. During the period, there were massive
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and secret investments and construction in mostly remote,
mountainous regions of western China, which was called the
"Third Front".

The highly vulnerable coastal cities were

regarded as the First Front.

The Second Front was a vaguely

defined "buffer zone" between the First Front and the Third
Front.

The basic objective of the Third Front was to build

a completely self-sufficient and secure industrial base to
provide China with strategic industrial production in the
event of foreign attack.
The Third Front program was China's response to a world
environment that she perceived to be extremely threatening.
With the increasing hostility between China and the Soviet
Union and the American escalation of the Vietnam War, China
found herself without a powerful ally and potentially
subject to hostile action by either or both super powers.
Under such circumstances, Mao Zedong, in August 1964, called
for a drastic acceleration of the inland construction plan,
based on his assessment that large-scale war was inevitable.
The area of the Third Front includes all of Sichuan,
Yunnan, Guizhou, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia, a part of
Shaanxi (south of the Qinling mountains), and the western,
mountainous portions of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan (Naughton
1988, 354).

This area (Figure 2) consists of mountains

above 500 meters in elevation, and basins such as the

Figure 2. The Third Front area of China. FIRST PHASE and SECOND PHASE refer to the first and second phases
of Third Front construction. Source: Naughton 1988, 354.
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Sichuan Basin.

Within this vast region, individual Third

Front factories were located in extremely remote sites,
scattered across thousands of square kilometers of the
generally mountainous terrain.

This pattern was summarized

by the Chinese as "shan, san, dong", which meant "in
mountains, in dispersion, in caves". It reflected the
military orientation of the Third Front, and was designed
to minimize damage from enemy air attack.
Moreover, the Third Front was to establish an
industrial system with a strong capacity of scientific
research. Therefore, not only factories but research
institutes as well were moved to the Third Front area.

In

some cases, entire factories were moved from their coastal
locations to the interior; but more often only a portion of
the original plant's work force and machinery was
transferred inland.

In other cases, a large number of

production facilities were built from scratch.

The major

sectors in the Third Front, where huge investment funds
were absorbed, included mining, energy production,
metallurgy (especially iron and steel) , machine building,
and military hardware.

In the absence of navigable

waterways and adequate highways, more than 5,000 kilometers
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of railways were constructed using mass human wave
construction techniques (Kirkby and Cannon 1989, 10).
During the seven years of Third Front construction,
29.000 state enterprises were built throughout the region,
with a huge work force of sixteen million, which accounted
for almost one-third of the total state payroll in the mid1960s (Kirkby and Cannon 1989, 9).

The program consists of

about 1,800 to 2,000 large- and medium-sized enterprises,
compared with a national total of approximately 5,000 in
1981 (Naughton 1988, 365; Cannon 1990, 39), and 200 major
research institutes (Naughton 1990, 365).
The percentage of total national investment that went
to the Third Front program is shown in Table 2,

According

to Li Zhengquan, within the Third Front area, the south
western (Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou Provinces) and the
north-western (Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia) regions
together received the highest proportion of investment,
35.1 percent and 24 percent during the Third and Fourth
Five-Year-Plans respectively (Li 1992,53).
A program of such magnitude had no precedent.

Never

before has such a large portion of any nation's industrial
development effort been directed into defense-related
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Table 2
Percentage of National Investment in Third Front
Year
1963-1965
Third FYPa, 1966-1970
Fourth FYPa, 1971-1975
Source: Naughton 1988, 365.
a FYP refers to Five-Year-Plan.

industrialization.

Percentage of National
Investment
38 .2%
52.7%
41.1%

Among its major achievements are: 1)

the creation of a railway system connecting previously
isolated parts of inland China; 2) the exploitation of
important ferrous and non-ferrous minerals; and 3) the
establishment of some fairly efficient manufacturing
enterprises in the interior (Naughton 1988, 375).
However, the Third Front program was costly
industrialization.

The Chinese leadership went far beyond

the creation of sheer military capability, and envisaged a
massive industrial system fully functional in both war and
peace.

Only about 20 percent of Third Front industrial

investment went to military industries (Naughton 1988,
373) .
The staggering cost of the Third Front was due to the
following factors.

First,, the nature of the terrain in the

Third Front area required large expenditures.

Second, with
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a maximum speed approach to preparatory work, for example,
project design and site selection were poor.

Nearly every

known project ran into substantial additional costs
(Naughton 1988, 376).

Third, the Third Front also reduced

the efficiency of investment in non-Third Front areas.
According to Naughton's calculation, China's annual
industrial output is 10-15 percent below what it would have
been if the Third Front had never been undertaken, and if
that investment had been used in other inland locations
(Naughton 1988, 379),

It was an unrealistic program that

could not be completed.

The Chinese economy simply did not

have the resources to complete the huge number of projects.
Construction of many projects was suspended or terminated
following the visit of American President Richard Nixon to
China in 1972, which marked the end of China's strategic
isolation.

In all, the Third Front had a deleterious

effect on Chinese economy not only because it was extremely
costly, but because the continuous flow of investment into
the Third Front projects drained China's supplies of food
and other consumer goods.
Even though the First Five-Year-Plan and the Third
Front program similarly placed large investment in interior
provinces, they differed in goals and locations (Fan 1995,
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422; Naughton 1988, 375).

The First Five-Year-Plan was

meant to promote spatial economic equalities, with
investment concentrated in a limited number of key cities
in the interior.

The Third Front was more for war planning

than regional economic planning.

Because of the magnitude

and uniqueness of the Third Front program, some studies
argue that the Chinese leadership during the pre-reform era
cared more about military strategy than spatial
inequalities (Kirkby and Cannon 1989, 4-6; Cannon and
Jenkins 1990, 28-32) .

However, this writer agrees with

Nicholas Lardy (Lardy 1980, 170-171) and Thomas Lyons
(Lyons 1991, 471) that spatial equalities were a major
concern to the Chinese leadership.

Egalitarianism was

consistently advocated and pursued throughout the pre
reform era, especially during the First Five-Year-Plan, the
Great-Leap-Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

Whether or

not these policies succeeded in reducing regional economic
disparities will be discussed in Chapter Five.
Between Mao Zedong's death in September 197 6 and Deng
Xiaoping's ascendancy to paramount leadership in December
1978, there was a transitional period.

During these two

years, Deng consolidated his power by purging Hua Guofeng,
Mao's chosen successor, and the "Gang of Four", a group of
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Deng's political enemies headed by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.
The time was ripe for Deng Xiaoping to initiate his
economic reform policy.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE REFORM ERA AFTER 197 8
Changes in the Political and Economic Systems
At the latter part of the 1970s China's paramount
leader, Deng Xiaoping, gradually came into power-

He

virtually took Mao's place after Mao's death in 197 6.

He

pushed forward a series of radical policies that are
generally named the reform and open-door polices.

These

policies have greatly changed China's political and economic
landscape.
In the political realm, there has been a fundamental
reinterpretation of socialism in China since reform.

In

December 1978, the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) announced a shift in Party focus to
modernization and economic growth.

This marked the

beginning of the reform era and rise of pragmatism.

In 1978

the CCP presented its new orthodoxy of socialism— the Theory
of the Primary Stage of Socialism— at its Thirteenth
48
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National Congress.

This theory was expected to provide an

explanation of the nature and tasks of "socialism, with
Chinese characteristics"/ a concept frequently cited by the
media in the 1980s.
The Theory of the Primary Stage of Socialism has two
main aspects.

The first aspect is that China has already

established a socialist society which must be preserved.
China has not only a socialist economic system, which is
based on public ownership of the means of production, but
also a socialist political system that has a guiding
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism.

The second aspect of the

theory is that China's socialism is in its beginning stage
in the course of socialist evolution.

China adopted

socialism when it was a semifeudal and semicolonial country
with a low level of economic development.

Hence, it was

thought that China would not be able to practice initially
"full socialism" since "full socialism" could only occur in
a mature socialist society.

The concept of "socialism with

Chinese Characteristics" was thus created as a variation of
socialism— one that respects China's unique historical
context (Fan 1995b, 424) .

Since poverty is a major

constraint to the further development of socialism in China,
the priority at the initial stage of socialism is to bring
about industrialization and economic growth rather than
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ideological struggle.

Other social or political criteria

are more or less subordinate to economic development.
Moreover, the Primary Stage Theory maintains that a primary
stage is unavoidable and may last for a long time. The Great
Leap Forward and the economic development aspects of the
Cultural Revolution were unrealistic mistakes based on
"utopian" views of rapid development beyond China's
capabilities at that time.

Now it is believed that the

primary stage of socialism will last until the middle of the
twenty-first century (Mackerras et al. 1994, 11-12).
In the economic realm, the reform era saw China
gradually growing out of the command system, or "plan" with
an institutionalized Dual Track System.

As part of the

reform package, the government gave explicit definition to
two separate spheres of economic activity— the planned
sector and the market sector.

The planned sector was

required to make transactions at fixed state prices,
according to compulsory state plans, but its scope was to be
diminished in absolute terms.

The market sector included

the remainder of the economy, based on market prices, and
its scope was allowed to grow.

Non-state enterprises,

especially rural industries, were an important part of the
market sector and almost all their transactions were at
market prices.

On the other hand, state enterprises were
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allowed to operate utilizing both elements of the Dual Track
System.

That is, they could operate according to principles

and demands of the state plan and also be engaged in
productive activity in the market sector at market prices.
After 1985, the participation of state enterprises in the
market sector has been a crucial component of the growth of
the market sector (Naughton 1995, 220-221).
The 1990s saw an acceleration of progress toward a free
market system.

At the beginning of 1992, Deng Xiaoping,

after a tour of South China, reaffirmed reform policies and
attacked conservative opposition that had emerged since the
Tiananmen Square incident.

In October 1992, the fourteenth

Party Congress proclaimed that China would adopt a socialist
market economy.

This was the first unambiguous, official

signal, that the ultimate goal of reform was transition to a
market economy (Naughton 1996, 289). Substantial
achievements were made during 1992-93, when, for the first
time, the government started to cut back on the state plan
and began to move toward a system of full market pricing.
Price controls on key producer goods such as coal, oil, and
steel, as well as important consumer goods, particularly
grain, began to be removed.

By mid-1990s, the end of the

Dual Track System was in sight because the command plan had
been sharply cut back and the movement toward market economy
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was inevitable.

China now has a market economy with a mixed

ownership base.

Productive enterprises of the traditional

command economy still exist, but a significant proportion of
these state enterprises is run at a loss.

The future of the

old state sector is likely to be short and privatization of
most remaining state enterprises is now under way.
Regional Economic Policy of the Reform Era
As part of the reform package, regional economic policy
of the reform era has undergone fundamental changes.

Deng

Xiaoping completely repudiated Mao's egalitarianism and
advocated policies that allowed some people and some regions
to get rich first so that they would set examples for others
that might eventually get rich, too.

The Primary Stage

Theory provides justification for the new regional economic
policy that emphasizes efficiency over equality.

Official

regional economic policy now expects and tolerates uneven
regional economic development so long as it improves
efficiency and produces economic results.
The changes in regional policy reflected painful
lessons learned from past failures (Zhang 1989, 71).

The

new Chinese leadership believed that the pro-interior
investment policy carried out in the pre-reform era ignored
efficiency and in general, failed to bring about improvement
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in people's living standards in general.

Even though there

were ups and downs, the economy as a whole grew rapidly from
1949 to 1978, particularly in the industrial sector.

But

China's planning system failed to achieve any significant
improvement in people's living standards during that period.
One of the reasons why the new leaders turned to radical
reform was because they wanted to deliver more of the
benefits of economic growth to the Chinese people in order
to solidify their newly-secured political position (Naughton
1996, 61).
The shift in regional economic policy also reflected
the influence of Western regional economic development
theories based on the experience of developed countries
(Zhang 1989, 71-72; Peng 1991, 3-4).

The Inverted-U Model

(Williamson 1965), the Core-Periphery Model (Friedmann 1966,
60-101), and the notion of Circular and Cumulative Causation
(Myrdal 1957), all predict an increase in spatial economic
inequalities during the initial stages of development
followed by diffusion and regional convergence in later
stages.

Since China is at an early stage in the development

continuum, an increase in regional economic inequalities is
inevitable in the short term (Zhang 1989, 71-72) .

The

United States is often cited as a supporting example because
its economic history of polarization and trickling-down
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ratifies the above contention.

Another example is Japan,

which, as a small country, suffered from decades of
disparities between the coastal areas and interior locations
(Zhang 1989, 72).
Growth Pole Theory (Hirschman 1958, 183-201; Richardson
197 6) has influenced the new urban policy.

This theory

maintains that economic growth initially concentrates in
selected growth poles before its diffusion to the
hinterland.

Growth Pole Theory helps to legitimize China's

renewed emphasis on development in medium- and large-sized
cities and on heavy investments in selected coastal
locations.
Three-Economic-Region Model
Regional economic policy of the reform era emphasizes
comparative advantage, regional specialization and division
of labor (Fan 1995, 425).

The idea of comparative advantage

culminated in China's Seventh Five-Year-Plan (1986-90),
which divided the country into three large economic regions,
the economically developed Eastern Region, the less
developed Central Region and the underdeveloped Western
Region (Figure 1).

The Eastern Region is also called the

coastal region and includes the twelve coastal provinces and
municipalities from Liaoning in the north to Hainan in the
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south.

The Central Region refers to nine provinces and

autonomous regions from Heilongjiang to Hunan, and the
Western Region is the remaining nine provinces and
autonomous regions in the interior.
The Three-Economic-Region Model is a blueprint for
regional economic policy of the reform era.

The three

regions were assigned different roles according to their
factor endowments.

The Eastern Region would develop export-

oriented industrialization and foreign trade.

In

particular, it would upgrade the technology of traditional
industries and develop high technology industry and high
value-added consumer products industry.

The Central Region

would focus on energy, raw materials, machinery, electrical
products, and agriculture.

The Western Region would

specialize in crop agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry
and transportation.

Moreover, the Western Region would

selectively develop its energy, mineral resources, and local
processing industries (Yang 1990, 242).
The role assigned to the Eastern Region should be
understood with regard to the open-door and foreign trade
policies that have been implemented since 1978.

The

theoretical support for China's foreign trade policy is
based on the Grand International Cycle Theory.
states that as developed countries and the newly

This theory
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industrialized economies (e.g., Singapore, Korea, Hongkong,
and Taiwan) move away from labor-intensive industries to
more sophisticated sectors, China should take advantage of
its large and cheap labor supply by specializing in laborintensive export-oriented industries.

This would bring in

foreign exchange and capital for infrastructural and
technological improvement (Fan 1995b, 425).
Export-led growth in the Eastern Region has been
largely realized through the establishment of a number of
open zones along the coast (Figure 1).

In 1979, Shenzhen,

Zhuhai, Shantou (all in Guangdong Province) and Xiamen (in
Fujian Province) were designated as Special Economic Zones
(SEZs). In 1984, fourteen Open Coastal Cities (OCCs) were
announced. Within these OCCs, Economic and Technical
Development Zones (ETDZs) were established for the
development of high technology industry.

In early 1985, the

Yangtze, Pearl, and Min River Deltas were designated as
Coastal Economic Development Zones (CEDZs).

In 1988, Hainan

Island became a province as well as the fifth SEZ.

In all

of these locations, foreign investors are given favorable
tax treatment, for example, tax reduction and tax exemption.
To promote these zones and cities, the state allocated large
investment to improve their infrastructure.
fact, state-selected growth poles.

They became, in

57

Although SEZs, OCCs, ETDZs, CEDZs differ in details,
all were designed to attract foreign capital, technology,
and management skill, and to increase exports (Yang 1990,
243). In order to achieve this goal, the central government
designed a series of spatially biased policies, namely,
"preferential policies", which obviously favored the coastal
region.

The five major preferential policies (Fan 1995b,

426) are as follows:
Revenue Remittance Policy.

Some coastal provinces such

as Guangdong are allowed to retain higher percentages of
their revenue and remit smaller shares to the state.
Financial Policy .

Coastal provinces and open zones

enjoy greater freedom than the rest of the country in terms
of currency circulation, credit, issuance of construction
bonds, and establishment of private financial institutions.
Foreign Exchange Retention Policy.

Open zones such as

SEZs enjoy higher foreign exchange retention rates.
Price Policy.

Primary and agricultural goods are

priced substantially lower market price than finished and
industrial products.
"scissors gap".

This price differential is called the

The scissors gap favors coastal provinces

at the expense of inland provinces because coastal provinces
sell high-priced industrial goods to inland provinces and
obtain low-priced primary products from them.
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Investment Policy.

The coastal region receives more

investment from the state in the form of loans and
subsidies. Table 3 shows coastal and interior shares of
total investment in fixed assets over time.

Total

investment in fixed assets includes both investments by
governments of various levels (central, provincial,
municipal, etc.) and investments by collectives and private
businesses.

Table 3 also shows that the coastal region's

share of total investment increased from about 51% in 1981
to about 56% in 1987, while the interior's share decreased
from about 49% in 1981 to about 40% in 1987.

Table 3
Percentage of Total Investment in Fixed Assets by Region
Year
Coast
50.94
1981
1982
50.82
1983
52.85
1984
52.85
1985
52.73
1987
56.12
Source: Yang 1990, 247 and Zhang 1989, 72.

Interior
49.16
49.18
47.15
47.15
47.27
39.77

Another source of investment has come from foreign
countries through joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned
enterprises.

Most of the foreign investment occurred in the
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coastal region, especially in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces
and the municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin.

The

principal reason for these choices are their geographic
locations, overseas connections and superior business
environments over the rest of the country.

Table 4 depicts

per capita foreign investment as a proportion of the
national average at the municipal, provincial, and
autonomous region levels.

The Eastern Region was obviously

the leader in attracting foreign investment with a mean
value more than ten times those of the Central and Western
regions.
Ladder-Step Theory
While the Three-Economic-Region Model relates to
regional specialization, the Ladder-Step Theory (Yang 1990,
244-246; Yang et al. 1988, 43-46) specifies the regional
preference of economic development.

This theory maintains

that the three macro-regions in China are like steps on a
ladder and the Eastern Region is the higher step.

Because

the three regions differ considerably in terms of
infrastructure, capital, technology, management skill and
economic efficiency, regional policy should focus on
developing the more advanced Eastern Region by providing it
with greater amount of capital, energy, and foreign currency
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Table 4
Foreign Investment Per Capita, 198 6-1990
(National Average=100)

Eastern Region (Mean)
Beijinga
Tianjin3
Hebei
Liaoning
Shanghai3
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Fujian
Shandong
Guangdong
Guangxib

1986
219
454
408
9
46
613
19
19
163
25
620
36

1988
224
786
372
6
102
467
32
41
133
18
492
22

1990
223
618
185
26
303
409
61
49
232
45
505
24

Central Region (Mean)
Shanxi
Inner Mongolia13
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Anhui
Jiangxi
Henan
Hubei
Hunan

20
4
12
73
27
27
9
4
9
14

11
4
7
8
27
17
12
11
12
3

17
4
8
21
22
12
16
7
29
38

Western Region (Mean)
16
Sichuan
8
Guizhou
10
Yunnan
4
Shaanxi
55
Gansu
2
Ningxiab
0
Xinjiang*3
30
Source: Adapted from Fan 1995b, 433.
a Municipalities
b Autonomous regions.

16
24
6
3
60
11
9
15

12
10
6
5
37
1
1
27
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than the Central and Western Regions.

Only after the

Eastern Region has become sufficiently developed, would
attention be given to the Central Region, and finally the
lowest step on the ladder would be the Western Region.
The logic for developing the coastal region first is
that its existing industrial capacity has made it a
processing center for inland raw materials and an export
base.

In addition, its higher level of technology and

managerial sophistication will enable it to absorb foreign
technology. Moreover, the Eastern Region is better suited to
develop indigenous capabilities for technical and economic
innovations, which can then be spread throughout the
economy.
The Ladder-Step Theory is a Chinese version of the
Inverted-U Model and Growth Pole Theory.

It focuses on the

coastal region, particularly coastal cities, as engines of
growth, or growth poles, and it contends that future
diffusion of growth will happen in the interior.

However,

Chinese proponents of the Ladder-Step Theory have rarely
elaborated on the mechanisms for bringing about diffusion.
They obviously consider this an issue to be addressed in the
future.

Deng Xiaoping's statement of dealing with the

regional gap problem by the end of the twentieth century
seemed to have provided a timeline for some researchers.

CHAPTER FIVE
REGIONAL INEQUALITIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Regional inequalities of economic development are
influenced by many factors, such as, geography, climate and
resource endowment of a region.

What is unique regarding

regional economic inequalities in China is~ that the central
government has played a more important role in shaping the
country spatially than governments of other countries.

With

its central economic control and significant investment, the
Chinese government has been able to direct regional economic
development and substantially affect the general economic
well-being of people.
A study of regional economic inequalities in China
involves the problem of regionalization.

China is a vast

country with an area of 9.6 million square kilometers.

As

such, there are enormous geographical, social and economic
variations across the nation.

Consequently, it is not easy

to classify China into a few large regions.
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This study has
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thus far described China as dichotomous with an economically
developed coastal region and a backward interior region, or
as tripartite with three large economic regions.

Clearly

though, such a simplified classification conceals
substantial variations within each region.

For example,

some counties in the relatively wealthy coastal region, less
than 250 kilometers from Shanghai, are among the poorest in
the country.

On the other hand, some counties in the poor

interior region, such as Xinjiang Autonomous Region, have
some of the highest per capita agricultural income (Cannon
1990, 33).

The above macro-regions share certain internal

characteristics, but one should not assume too much
similarity within them.

Even the thirty administrative

provinces do not coincide perfectly with natural economic
regions (Riskin 1987, 225).

For the convenience of study,

"provinces" as used here refer to twenty-two provinces, five
autonomous regions, and the three municipalities of
Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin.

Since relevant data exist

at the provincial level and national expenditures are
allocated to each province, the Chinese provinces are in
fact planning regions.

Therefore, this research mainly

presents regional economic inequalities between provinces.
In addition, some discussion about spatial economic
inequalities between the three economic regions will be
presented later in this chapter.
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The term "regional economic inequalities" is ambiguous
as to what is to be equalized or balanced.

In this study,

focus is on regional income, or provincial income, since
provinces are the regional units of interest.

The best

indicator of provincial income is gross national product
(GNP) calculated at the provincial level.

Unfortunately,

early provincial statistical reports in China rarely
recorded provincial GNP.

However, data that have been

published by provincial authorities on gross value of
industrial and agricultural output (GVIAO) can be used as a
surrogate of provincial income.

Because GVIAO is the

largest and the most important component of GNP, it is
reasonable to use GVIAO data for a preliminary investigation
of the degree of interprovincial income inequality.

In late

1987, the State Statistical Bureau of China released a
compendium of provincial income accounts.

The most

important indicator in the accounts is net material product
(NMP).

NMP is the nominal gross value of output minus

nominal material consumption.

It is national income that

originates in the five "material production sectors":
agriculture, industry, construction, transportation, and
commerce.

NMP differs from GNP in excluding depreciation,

and many services that do not contribute directly to
material production.

The value-added measure, NMP, is much

more desirable than GVIAO as a surrogate of provincial
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income because gross value of output allows double-counting
to an extent that it varies across sectors and regions and
over time (Lyons 1991, 473).

Provincial output value and

NMP are used as surrogates of provincial income for
examining regional income inequality in the pre-reform era.
For the reform era, provincial output value, NMP, and GNP
are used.
There are absolute and relative measures of provincial
income inequality.

An example of an absolute measure is the

range between the highest and lowest provincial income per
capita.

Two most commonly used relative measures are 1) the

ratio of the highest provincial income per capita to the
lowest (the high-low ratio), and 2) coefficient of variation
of provincial income per capita.

The coefficient of

variation is the ratio of the standard deviation of
provincial per capita income data to its average
(coefficient of variation = standard deviation/average).
The larger the coefficient of variation, the greater
provincial income inequality.
Regional Income Inequality in the Pre-Reform Era
Nicholas Lardy's work (Lardy 1980) was the first to
provide a detailed and systematic account of China's
regional income inequality (Tsui 1991, 1).

He converts the

officially reported gross value data for industry and
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agriculture output to net values, which actually become a
form of national income originating in industry and
agriculture (Table 5).

The second column of Table 5 shows

the sum of per capita value added in industry and
agriculture by province in 1957, expressed as a proportion
of the national average.

Shanghai, the largest industrial

center, was almost six times as developed as the national
average and more than eight times as developed as Henan, one
of the poorest provinces in 1957.

The municipalities of

Beijing and Tianjin, and the northeastern provinces
(Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning) were also among the most
developed.

Shandong, Fujian, Guangxi, Henan, Sichuan, and

Guizhou all had per capita value added in industry and
agriculture of less than 80 percent of the national average.
They were the least developed regions of the country.
Tibet and Ningxia would likely be included among these
provinces, but data were lacking.

When industry and

agriculture are examined separately, the relatively even
distribution of agricultural output is very noticeable.
Except for the three municipalities of Shanghai, Tianjin,
and Beijing, whose suburban areas had only limited
cultivated land before 1958, there was little regional
disparity in agriculture.

On the other hand, there was

striking disparity in the industrial sector.

The

concentration of industrial output in the three
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Table 5
Per Capita Output in 1957
Provinces®
Coastal Region
Liaoning
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shandong
Jiangsu
Shanghai
Zhejiang
Fujian
Guangdong
Guangxi
Central Region
Heilongjiang

(National Average=100)

Industry and
Agriculture
200
191
391
93
74
86
587
93
79
95
74

185

Jilin
Inner Mongolia

132
115

Shanxi
Henan
Anhui
Hubei
Jiangxi
Hunan

97
70
80
104
90
80

Industry

Agriculture

401

81

473

21
21

1,101
56
62
83
1, 550
78
69
82
34

115
82
88
12
103
85
102
97

219
157
68

166

95
29
37
75

98
95
105

52
41

117
143

122
111
103

Western Region
Xinjiang
Gansu
Ningxia
Shaanxi
Qinghai
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Tibet
High-Low Ratios0

132
89

65
36
10

171
119

106

58

135

137
77

40
56
30

194

b

75
82
b

8.4:1
0.29

48
7
51.7:1
0.92

b

90
102
103
b

13.8:1
0.19

Population-Weighted
Coefficients of
Variation
Source: Lardy 1980, 160-161.
Data for Ningxia and Tibet are from Riskin
226.
a "Provinces" include provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities.
b No data.
° Calculated by this writer, Ningxia and Tibet excluded.
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municipalities and the three northeastern provinces was very
marked.

This pattern is reflected in the coefficient of

variation for industrial sector ■(■0.92), which was more than
4 times as high as that for agriculture (0.19).
The above indicates that substantial income inequality
between provinces did exist in the 1950s, and that
industrial growth was the major source of regional income
disparity.

China's annual industrial growth between 1952

and 1974 averaged 12 percent while annual agricultural
growth was only 3,5 percent (Lardy 1980, 163). Since
industry was the major cause of interprovincial income
inequality and was also the most rapidly growing sector, it
is reasonable to conclude that trends in regional income
disparity could be largely determined by differences in
provincial industrial growth (Lardy 1980, 163) .
It should be noted that income disparity in the prereform China was not reflected in substantial interregional
variations in real personal income, but in provincial
transfers to the central government.

Because wage rates

were determined and fixed by the central government, there
was little variation in urban income throughout the country.
Through its redistribution mechanism, the central government
was able to transfer income from wealthy provinces to poor
ones.

For example, Shanghai, Tianjin and the northeastern

provinces of Heilongjiang and Liaoning annually remitted to
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the central government from 50 percent to 90 percent of
their revenues.

The less developed provinces, such as,

Tibet and Xinjiang, generally retained all their revenues
and received subsidies from the central government from 50
percent to 80 percent of their own local expenditures (Lardy
1980, 173) .
Since regional income disparity was largely determined
by industrial growth, and data on provincial industrial
growth were more plentiful and complete than data on
agriculture or services, various studies have focused on the
industrial sector. Table 6 shows per capita industrial
output by province in 1952, 1957, and 1974 expressed as a
proportion of the national average.

The provinces are

arranged in descending order of per capital industrial
output in 1952.

There was a modest trend toward

equalization of per capita provincial industrial output from
1952 to 1974.

The performance of the poorest provinces in

1952, generally improved in 1957 and 1974, especially Henan,
Gansu, Qinghai and Shaanxi, which all experienced high
growth rates. On the other hand, the wealthy provinces of
1952 tended to converge toward the national average by 1974,
especially the three northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang,
Jilin, and Liaoning, as well as the municipalities of
Shanghai and Tianjin, which were growing at a relatively
slow pace.

Meanwhile, Beijing enjoyed high growth.
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Table 6
Per Capita Industrial Output, 1952, 1957, 1974
(National Average^=100)
1952
Provinces3
1, 864
Shanghai
1,244
Tianj in
483
Beij ing
Liaoning
377
Heilongj iang
277
Jilin
166
Jiangsu
108
Zhej iang
81
Guangdong
80
Shanxi
76
Shandong
73
Xinj iang
62
Hebei
60
Jiangxi
58
Hubei
58
Fuj ian
53
45
Inner Mongolia
Sichuan
43
Shaanxi
42
Hunan
40
Qinghai
38
Gansu
35
Anhui
35
Henan
33
Guangxi
33
Yunnan
32
Guizhou
30
Population1.01
Weighted
Coefficients of
Variation
Source: Lardy 1980, 164-165.
a "Provinces" include provinces,
municipalities.

1957
1, 550
1,101
473
401
219
157
83
78
82
95
62
65
56
52
75
69
68
56
58
41
40
35
37
29
34
48
30
0.92

autonomous

1974
1,303
1,057
632
297
144
138
99
59
88
73
70
48
101
51
66
57
98
38
63
45
59
70
36
41
40
35
33
0.86

regions,

and
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This trend, the poor provinces growing faster than the
rich ones in the industrial sector, was further confirmed by
the population-weighted coefficients of variation, which
declined from 1.01 in 1952 to 0.92 in 1957, and to 0.86 in
1974.
Carl Riskin's study (Riskin 1987) confirms Lardy's
finding that there was a modest trend toward equalization of
per capita industrial output in the pre-reform era.

Table 7

shows that the relative measures of inequality (the high-low
ratio and the coefficients of variation) were either
declining from 1957 to 1979, or at least remaining constant.
However, according to Riskin, the absolute difference
measured in yuan (Chinese currency), between the highest per
capita provincial industrial output and the lowest, was
widening considerably between 1957 and 1979.

The gap grew

from 1,644 yuan in 1957 to over 5,000 yuan in 1979 (Riskin
1987, 231).

This widening of the gap reflects the much

lower base from which the poorest provinces began. It means
that despite gradually converging industrial growth rates,
the absolute gap between rich and poor provinces widened
considerably from the 1950s to the late 1970s.
It should be pointed out that Riskin's calculations
(Table 7) are different from Lardy's (Table 5 and 6) due to
the following.

First, Riskin uses gross value of industrial

output (GVIO), while Lardy converts gross values to value-
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Table 7
Per Capita Industrial Output,
1957, 1965, 1974, 1979 (National Average=100)
Provinces®

1957

1965

1974

1979

Coastal Region
Liaoning

385

334

300

257

Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shandong
Jiangsu
Shanghai

481

385

513

1,112
55
62
84
1,517

572
86

617
663

93
1, 165

Zhejiang
Fuj ian
Guangdong

76
69
84

72
56
94

Guangxi

33

32

Heilongjiang

222

195

127

141

Jilin
Inner Mongolia
Shanxi
Henan
Anhui
Hubei
Jiangxi
Hunan

161

148
251
b

120
63
91

41
40

109
187
72
43
36

74
54

64
b

58
49

40

41

44

82
51
10
56

86
87

46
100

24
73
73
53

35
64
99

58

498
84

122
77
113

87
138

1,404

1,106

58
48

85
39

85

79

37

57

Central Region

60
92
30
36

50
51
86
51
63

Western Region
Xinjiang
Gansu
Ningxia
Shaanxi
Qinghai
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Tibet
High-Low Ratios0

45
55
33
48
7

48
38
13

152:1

49:1

41
34
32

54
92
80
80
78
54
36
40

14

11

44:1

31:1

Coefficients of
1.87
1.50
1.72
1.49
Variation
Source: Riskin 1987 , 226.
a "Provinces” refer to provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities.
No data.
c Tibet is excluded because of uncertainty about its statistics.
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added.

Second, when calculating the coefficients of

variation, Lardy includes the three municipalities in
their adjacent provinces (Shanghai in Jiangsu, Beijing and
Tianjin in Hebei), while Riskin treats them similar to
individual provinces.

This explains why Riskin's indices

are higher than Lardy's.

Third, Lardy uses population-

weighted coefficients of variation (standard deviation
weighted by provincial populations/average weighted by
provincial populations), while Riskin uses unweighted
coefficients of variation (standard deviation/average).

If

regional disparity is the concern, use of unweighted
coefficient may be more appropriate (Lyon 1991, 475; Zhang
1992, 19-20).

However, existing empirical studies employing

either measure give very similar results.
The availability of NMP data in 1987 has enabled many
studies utilizing this better surrogate of GNP.

Thomas

Lyons (Lyons 1991) uses provincial NMP as an indicator of
regional income and examines interprovincial income
disparity in China from 1952 to 1987 (Table 8).
Column 1 of Table 8 is arranged in descending order by
the provinces' initial NMP per capita in 1953.

The

provinces are also classified into three groups on the basis
of initial levels of NMP per capita in 1953, roughly
representing the richer provinces (Group 1), the middleincome provinces (Group 2), and the poor provinces (Group
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Table 8
Growth Rates of Real Net Material Product (NMP) and Real
Industrial Net Material Product Per Capita
Provinces3

Group 1
Heilongj iang
Liaoning
Jiangsu
Inner Mongolia
Xinj iang
Jilin
Hebei
Group 2
Shanxi
Guangdong
Jiangxi
Fuj ian
Hubei
Gansu
Shaanxi
Shandong
Group 3
Henan
Hunan
Yunnan
Sichuan
Guizhou

NMP Growth
Rate (% per
annum,
1952-1987)

2.6
4.2
6.1
2.1
2.1
3.3
4.9

3.5
4.1
2.6
3.4
3.6
3.5
4.0
4.8

4.3
3.9
3.2
3.7
2.4

Provinces

Industrial
NMP Growth
Rate (% per
annum,
1952-1985)

Group 1
Liaoning
Heilongj iang
Jiangsu
Hebei
Jilin

5.4
4.7
6.5
6.3
5.4

Group 2
Guangdong
Fuj ian
Xinj iang
Inner Mongolia
Shangdong
Shanxi
Hubei
Shaanxi

7.0
7.6
4.9
4.8
8.2
6.3
8.1
8.2

Group 3
Yunnan
Sichuan
Henan
Hunan
Guizhou
Gansu

5.8
7.0
10.4
8.1
6.5
10.1

China
4.1
China
7.1
Source: Lyons 1991, 484.
3 "Provinces" refer to provinces and autonomous regions.
The three municipalities are included in their adjacent
provinces, with Shanghai in Jiangsu, Beijing and Tianjin in
Hebei.
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3).

The grouping is representative of the entire 1952-1957

period-

Column 2 gives the annual average growth rates of

provincial NMP for the 1952-1987 period.

An examination of

Column 1 and 2 reveals no significant negative correlation
between the initial level of development as indicated by the
ordering in Column 1 and the subsequent rates of development
as indicated by the growth rates in Column 2 (Lyons 1991,
485). Some of the highest growth rates occurred in Group 1-the rich provinces in 1953 (6.1 percent for Jiangsu with
Shanghai included, and 4.9 percent for Hebei with Beijing
and Tianjin included).

Among the five poorest provinces in

Group 3, only one (Henan) grew at a rate higher than the
national average. The data indicate that over the long term,
real NMP per capita generally did not grow more rapidly in
the poor provinces than in the richer ones.

This fact

implies that the absolute income gap between the rich and
the poor provinces was widening rather than narrowing.
Though NMP per capita is a better indicator of
provincial income, much of the research concerning regional
development in China has focused more narrowly on the
industrial sector, as industrial growth is regarded as the
major source of regional income inequality in China.

In

Column 3 of Table 8, the provinces are again listed in
descending order by initial industrial NMP per capita in
1953, classified into three groups.

The grouping is
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representative of the entire 1952-1957 period, and the group
boundaries are chosen to provide distinct intervals in terms
of industrial NMP per capita between groups.

Column 4 of

Table 8 gives the annual average growth rates of provincial
industrial NMP for the 1952-1985 period.

According to

Lyons, there is a negative correlation between initial level
of industrial NMP per capita as indicated by the ordering in
Column 3 and subsequent rate of industrialization as
indicated by the growth rates in Column 4 (Lyons 1991, 485).
The five provinces in Group 1 with the highest industrial
NMP per capita in the 1953 all grew below the national
average while four out of six poorest provinces in Group 3
grew at or above the national average.

According to Lyons

(Lyons 1991, 486), the six least-industrialized provinces,
as a group, grew at a higher rate (7.1 percent per annum)
than the five most industrialized provinces (5.8 percent per
annum). The nine middle-income provinces (in terms of
initial level of development in 1953) grew at an
intermediate rate of 6.6 percent.

This confirms Lardy's

finding based on per capita industrial value-added data that
less industrialized provinces generally grew at higher rates
than industrialized provinces in the pre-reform era (Lardy
1980, 165) .
However, this growth pattern is not significant when
the difference in initial levels of industrialization are
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taken into consideration.

The six poorest provinces were

almost devoid of industry throughout the 1950s.

For the

entire group, industrial NMP per capita ranged from less
than 10 yuan in 1952 to only about 18 yuan by 1957.

During

the 1950s, industrial NMP per capita in Liaoning was about
12 times that in Guizhou or Gansu (Lyons 1991, 486).

For

industrial growth from a near-zero base, an examination of
absolute increments will be more helpful than the growth
rates alone. Lyons' estimates on absolute increments in
provincial industrial NMP per capita from 1952 to 1985 show
that the less industrialized provinces were not catching up
with the most industrialized ones (Lyons 1991, 486-487).

In

other words, the absolute gaps did not begin to narrow.
This confirms Riskin's finding, based on absolute
differences in gross values of per capita industrial output,
that the absolute income gap was widening during the pre
reform era (Riskin 1987, 231).
To summarize, Lardy (Lardy 1980), Riskin

(Riskin 1987),

and Lyons (Lyons 1991) all agree that the absolute gap
between rich and poor provinces did not narrow in the pre
reform era, though poor provinces were growing
rich ones in the industrial sector.

faster than

Lyons' study (Lyons

1991) using NMP data from 1952 to 1987, however, is more
convincing than Lardy's (Lardy 1980) or Risin's (Riskin
1987) .

Lyons is able to trace the long-term trend of
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national income by province, while Lardy and Riskin use
arbitrary beginning and ending years due to incompleteness
of earlier data.

(Lardy uses data for years 1952, 1957, and

1974; Riskin uses data for years 1957, 1965, 1974, and
1979.)

Therefore, Lardy's and Riskin's conclusions, based

on declining coefficients of variation for the selected
years that the relative spatial inequality in regional
income was decreasing, cannot be accepted without doubt.
Lyon's major finding, that relative income disparity
indicated by NMP per capita was not narrowing over the long
term, is reached by examining the whole series of data from
1952 to 1987 instead of selecting arbitrary years. Kai Yuen
Tsui's study (Tsui 1991), using the same data as Lyon's,
confirms the latter's finding that neither absolute nor
relative income disparity narrowed in the pre-reform years
despite biased regional policy.
Table 9 presents the values of the coefficients of
variation derived from real per capita NMP and National
Income utilized (NIU).

NIU is the sum of consumption and

accumulation, including social consumption, private
consumption and saving.

The difference between NIU and NMP

is theoretically equal to the inflow of resources, or, the
outflow of resources if it is negative.

This difference is

largely a result of government transfers through the
redistribution mechanism (Tusi 1991, 4).

The two indices in
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Table 9
Coefficients of Variation of Real Provincial Net Material Product
(NMP) and National Income Utilized (NIU) Per Capita, 1952-1985
Year
CVa-NMP
1952
0.395
1953
0.443
0.425
1954
1955
0.406
1956
0.433
1957
0.434
1958
0.533
1959
0. 625
1960
0.687
1961
0.535
1962
0.458
1963
0.477
1964
0.471
1965
0.463
1966
0.480
1967
0.436
1968
0.523
1969
0.571
1970
0.548
1971
0.549
1972
0.553
1973
0.585
1974
0. 646
1975
0. 614
1976
0.652
1977
0. 603
1978
0. 615
1979
0.605
1980
0. 600
1981
0.587
1982
0.561
1983
0.554
1984
0.553
1985
0.574
Source: Tsui 1991, 8.
a Coefficient of variation.

CVa-NIU
0.363
0.410
0.367
0.309
0.316
0.348
0.388
0.456
0.484
0.465
0.317
0.387
0.386
0.338
0.300
0.326
0.388
0.341
0.307
0.342
0.353
0.380
0.422
0.413
0.451
0.379
0.396
0.413
0.404
0.420
0.409
0.394
0.431
0.465
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Table 9 measure two different, but related facets of
regional economic inequalities.

The provincial per capita

NMP is the per capita net value of output produced within a
province.

It is an indicator of regional income.

The

provincial per capital NIU measures the average amount of
resources actually at the disposal of the residents of a
province, plus or minus government transfers.

It is an

indicator of the level of consumption.
According to Tsui (Tsui 1991,10), the data for the
years around the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) are not very
reliable due to the breakdown of the national statistical
system at that time.

Disregarding the year around the Great

Leap Forward, the indices do not seem to display any
significant trend in the period before the mid-1960s (Figure
3).

Compared with the years prior to the Great Leap

Forward, the levels of the NMP-based coefficient of
variation are higher in the 1970s and the first half of the
1980s.

In the long run, the interprovincial income gap has

become more pronounced.
The values of coefficients of variation based on per
capita real NIU are consistently lower than those based on
per capita real NMP (Figure 3).

It suggests that government

transfers played a critical role in reducing regional income
disparity. The indices do not exhibit any long-run trend in
the 1950s and the 1960s.

But between 1970 and 1976, there

0.8

Coefficient

of Variation

0.7

0.6

0.5
■CV-NMP
■CV-NIU

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Year
Figure 3. Coefficients of variation of real provincial Net Material Product (NMP) and Net Income Utilized
(NIU) per capita, 1952-1985. CV in the legend refers to coefficient of variation. Source: Tsui 1991, 8.
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is a sustained increase in the NIU-based indices.

The

coefficient of variation increased from 0.307 in 1970 to
0.451 in 197 6.

Though there was a dip in the value of

coefficient of variation in 1977, the trend was basically
upward up to 1985.

This upward trend, though very mild,

suggests that despite continuous efforts on the part of the
central government, interregional transfers did not bring
about any reduction in regional income inequality over the
long run (Tsui 1991, 12).
Neither the NIU-based nor the NMP-based coefficients
of variation display any discernible trend in the 1950s and
1960s.

Though the coefficients of variation peaked during

the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), the reliability of the
data for this period is hard to assess.

The values of the

coefficient of variation for the 1970s and 1980s are not
lower than those in the normal years of the 1950s and
1960s.
To summarize, the absolute inequality of provincial
income as indicated by per capita industrial output (Riskin
1987) and NMP (Lyons 1991) widened considerably throughout
the pre-reform era.

In the short run, relative inequality

seemed to have decreased (Lardy 1980; Riskin 1987), but not
significantly. Over the long term, relative income
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inequality did not show any sign of a decrease (Lyons 1991;
Tusi 1991) .

Regional Income Inequality in the Reform Era
The pro-coast regional policy implemented in the
reform era, emphasizing efficiency over equality, was
expected to enlarge the income gap between regions.
Whether regional income inequality has increased depends on
the scale of analysis.

For this study, empirical evidence

pertaining to regional income inequality between the
provinces is examined.
Contrary to the expectation, provincial income
inequality showed a declining trend in the early reform
era.

According to Cindy Fan, whose study is based on per

capita output data, this trend persisted until 1990 (Fan
1995b, 428).

Yang Weimin also reports that regional income

inequality as indicated by provincial per capita GNP
decreased from 1978 to 1989 (Yang 1992, 72).

Thomas Lyons

agrees that the NMP data for 1978-1987 does not suggest
that the reforms caused an increase in provincial income
inequality (Lyons 1991, 476-477).

Table 10 indicates that

regional income inequality measured by the coefficient of
variation of provincial industrial output per capita was
decreasing throughout the 1980s until early 1990s.
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Table 10

Coefficients of Variation of
Provincial Industrial Output Per Capita
Year
1979
1984
1989
1992
1993
Source: Li 1990,30.

Coefficient of Variation
1.49
1.32
1.03
0.94
1.01

Despite the pro-coast regional policy implemented in
the 1980s, it seems that total and industrial inequalities
declined.

This paradoxical finding can be explained by the

variable growth of individual provinces (Table 11).
In 1980 Jiangsu was near the national average, and
Zhejiang and Guangdong were below the national average
(Table 11). However, all three exceeded the national
average by 1990.

According to Li Si-Min (Li 1996,36).

Guangdong's rank of gross value of industrial output per
capita was sixteen among the twenty-nine provinces in 1979.
It rose to the seventh in 1989.

In fact, Guangdong

attained the highest provincial GDP by 1990 (Li 1996, 36).
Moreover, Fujian and Shandong, both below the national
average in 1980, were rapidly converging to the average.
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Table 11
Total Output Per Capita,
1980

1980--1990 (National Average =100)
1982

1984

1986

1988
158

157

1990

162

161

159

156

Beijing

300

284

291

256

258

256

Tianjin

275

276

264

250

254

258

Eastern Region (Mean)

65

63

64

66

70

72

Liaoning

155

149

146

152

152

144

Shanghai

559

528

489

448

411

400

Jiangsu

Hebei

104

108

119

136

148

143

Zhejiang

83

93

102

118

126

123

Fujian

56

62

64

68

74

77

Shandong

58

69

76

80

89

97

Guangdong

84

89

93

99

109

118

Guangxi

46

49

42

42

42

43

66

68

69

71

69

69

Shanxi

68

73

78

74

70

73

Inner Mongolia

53

58

58

59

61

63

Central Region (Mean)

Jilin

89

87

95

93

96

90

109

108

103

106

94

99

Anhui

46

50

54

60

57

54

Jiangxi

56

53

51

54

54

54

Henan

46

46

47

53

54

55

Hubei

68

73

79

83

81

77

Hunan

60

62

59

61

56

55

Heilongj iang

Western Region (Mean)

53

53

53

55

55

56

Sichuan

46

48

49

52

53

53

Guizhou

30

33

36

35

35

34

Yunnan

39

42

43

41

41

45

Shaanxi

55

55

55

57

57

58

Gansu

58

53

53

57

56

57

Qinghai

75

69

67

68

67

63

Ningxia

61

58

60

64

62

63

Xinjiang

59

63

65

66

72

77

2,277

2, 467

2, 984

3, 446

3,902

3, 978

National Average
(yuan, in 1990
constant price)
Source: Fan 1995b, 430.
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On the other hand, the three municipalities of Shanghai,
Beijing, and Tianjin, and Liaoning Province all experienced
slow growth.

Rapid growth of the above five provinces

within the Eastern Region was

offset by

slow growth ofthe

three municipalities and Liaoning in the same region.

This

resulted in decreased income inequality within the Eastern
Region, which in turn caused provincial income disparity to
decrease because of this region's larger share of output
relative to the other two regions.
above four provinces was more

Slow growth of the

apparent when considering

industrial output (Table 12).

Table 12
Gross Value of Industrial Output (GVIO) Per Capita
(National Average=100)
Provinces
Shanghai
Beij ing
Tianj in
Liaoning
Source: Li 1996, 37.

1979
1108
513
498
257

1993
480
265
295
169

Table 13 shows income inequality indicated by GNP per
capita within the three economic regions.

It indicates

that the most important factor contributing to the
declining income disparity between provinces in the early
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reform era was the reduced spatial inequalities within the
Eastern Region and the Central Region.

The coefficients of

variation went down by more than 4 percent annually for the
Eastern Region, and almost 7 percent for the Central
Region.

Table 13
Coefficients of Variation of Gross National Product (GNP)
Per Capita by the Three Economic Regions

Year

China

1978
0.97
1979
0.91
1980
0.90
1981
0.87
1982
0.82
1983
0.79
1984
0.76
1985
0.75
1986
0.73
1987
0.70
1988
0. 68
1989
0.66
Annual Change
-3.47%
of CVa
Source: Yang 1992, 72.
a Coefficient of variation.

Eastern
Region
0.88
0.86
0.85
0.81
0.77
0.74
0.69
0.68
0. 65
0.61
0.57
0.55
-4.23%

Central
Region
0.43
0.39
0.40
0.38
0.3 6
0.35
0.31
0.25
0.25
0.23
0.20
0.20
-6.83%

Western
Region
0.28
0.24
0.22
0.24
0.23
0.24
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.23
0.24
0.24
-1.43%

Two factors led to the decrease in spatial inequality
of GNP per capita within the Eastern Region.

One was the

slow growth of the municipalities of Tianjin and Shanghai,
and Liaoning Province, which had the highest GNP per capita
in 1978.

According to Yang, GNP per capita grew from 1978

to 1989 by 289 percent, 219 percent, and 219 percent
respectively for the above three regions, well below the
national average of 380 percent (Yang 1992, 73).

The GNP

per capita of the most industrialized provinces and
municipalities in the Eastern Region converged towards the
mean value of the region during 1978-1989, narrowing the
gap between the provinces in the Eastern Region.

The other

factor was the high growth that occurred in the least
industrialized provinces and the provinces with middlelevel income-in the Eastern Region.

The five eastern

provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and
Guangdong all had GNP per capita below the national average
in 1978.

But their GNP per capita grew from 1978 to 1989

by 437 percent, 573 percent, 529 percent, 462 percent, and
593 percent respectively compared with a national average
of 380 percent (Yang 1992, 741) .

Their rapid growth

contributed to the decrease in income inequality within the
Eastern Region.
The decrease in regional income inequality during
1978-1989 within the Central Region can also be explained
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by two factors.

One is the slow growth of previously more

developed provinces such as Jilin and Heilongjiang, whose
GNP per capita growth rates, according to Yang Weimin, were
218 percent and 306 percent respectively during 1978-1989
compared with a national average of 380 percent (Yang 1992,
74).

The other factor is the high growth of previously

less developed provinces such as Anhui, Hubei, and Hunan,
whose GNP per capita grew at 436 percent, 436 percent, and
406 percent respectively, compared with the national
average of 380 percent (Yang 1992, 74)..
Thus, relative inequality of provincial income
surprisingly decreased in the early reform era until the
early 1990s.

This was largely due to slow growth of the

rich provinces and rapid growth of some of the poor as well
as middle-income provinces.

Income Inequality between the Three Economic Regions
The Eastern Region's share of the gross value of
industrial output (GVIO) was consistently decreasing in the
1950s and 1960s (Table 14) due to the channeling of
resources to the interior provinces.
1980s, it stayed around 60 percent.

From 1965 to the midIn other words, the

Eastern Region's share of GVIO did not increase immediately
during the early reform period.

It was not until the end
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of the 1980s that it began to go up gradually.

The Western

Region had its largest share of GVIO at the end of the
1970s.

Then it went up and down with a slight downward

trend. Only the Central Region's share of GVIO exhibited an
obvious downward trend during the reform era, especially at
the end of the 1980s.

Table 14
Share of Gross Value of Industrial Output (GVIO) by Region,
1952-1993 (%)
Year

Eastern
Region
1952
68.11
1957
65.24
60.84
1965
59.87
1970
1979
59.23
1980
60.82
1985
60.24
1991
63.75
67.07
1993
Source: Li 1996, 26.

Central
Region
22.43
23.00
27.24
27.39
27. 64
27.54
27.18
24.52
22.34

Western
Region
9.46
11.76
11.91
12.74
13.12
11.64
12.58
11.74
10.59

An examination of the growth rates of NMP by the three
economic regions is presented in Table 15.

During the

First Five-Year-Plan, the Western Region grew fastest, with
an annual NMP per capita growth rate of 10.82 percent.

The

Eastern and the Central Regions had similar growth rates of
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Table 15

Growth Rates of NMP Per Capita (%)
Eastern
Region
7 .12
2.94

First FYPa (1953-1957)
Great Leap Forward and
Readjustment (1958-1965)
4 .08
Third FYPa (1966-1970)
Fourth FYPa (1971-1975)
4.79
Fifth FYPa (1976-1980)
8.95
Sixth FYPa (1981-1985)
12 .60
Seventh FYPa (1986-1989)
15.13
1989-1991
5.7 6
1992
16.35
Source: Li 1996, 26.
a FYP refers to Five-Year-Plan.

about 7 percent.

Central
Region
6.96
3.12

Western
Region
10. 82
3.72

3.16
2.44
7.91
12.14
14.05
3.48
14.44

0.79
2. 67
8. 69
12.05
14. 68
6.11
15. 01

The failure of the Great Leap Forward

caused the regional NMP growth rates to plunge to about 3
percent.

The Cultural Revolution and the Third-Front

program that took- place during The Third and Fourth FiveYear-Plan resulted in the relatively low NMP growth rates.
This again demonstrates the inefficiency of the Third
Front, which was clearly at the expense of national growth,
and the disruptive effects of the Cultural Revolution on
Chinese economy.

Even with the pro-interior regional

economic policy, the Eastern Region still grew faster than
the Central and Western Regions.

During the Third Five-
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Year-Plan, the Western Region's NMP per capita grew at 0.79
percent, much slower than the Eastern Region (4.08 percent)
and the Central Region (3.16 percent).

During the Fourth

Five-Year-Plan, the Eastern Region was still apparently in
the leading position.

Its per capita NMP grew at 4.79

percent compared with 2.67 percent of the Western Region,
and 2,-44 percent of the Central Region.

In the reform era

(the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Five-Year-Plans), however,
the three regions showed surprisingly similar NMP growth
rates until the early 1990s.
Thus, according to Table 14 and Table 15, spatial
income inequality between the three economic regions
declined prior to the Third Front activities.

It increased

during the Third Front and the Cultural Revolution.

In the

early reform era, the situation of spatial income
inequality did not worsen.

It was not until the early

1990s that the Eastern Region began to outgrow the Central
and the Western Region.

Because of incompleteness of data,

nothing can be said with confidence regarding regional
income inequality since the early 1990s.

CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Empirical evidence examined in Chapter Five indicates
that neither- absolute nor relative measures of regional
income inequality declined during the pre-reform era.

In

fact, absolute income inequality widened substantially
throughout the period, and relative inequality had become
more pronounced by the end of the pre-reform era.
While major changes were not achieved, it would be a
mistake to conclude that the pre-reform regional economic
policy failed.

According to Williamson's Inverted-U Model

(Williamson 1965), one would expect substantial increase in
regional income disparity in the early years of economic
development.

In China's case, one does not see a clear

triumph of inequality.

If not for the vigorous

implementation of the interior-oriented regional economic
policy, there would have been greater polarization in the
coastal region.

The pre-reform regional economic policy
93
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transferred wealth from rich provinces to poor ones through
the central government's redistribution function, which, in
the short term, helped to reduce regional income disparity.
In the long term, however, it failed to bring about real
improvement in regional income inequality.
Though the pre-reform regional economic policy was not
a total failure, it was carried out at an extremely high
cost, and at the expense of overall growth and efficiency.
The entire 1949-1978 period saw a respectable growth of
output, combined with massive waste of the fruits of growth.
Real Net Material Product per capita grew at about 3 percent
during 1953-1978 (Naughton 1991, 251).

But rapid economic

growth had not brought substantial benefits to the
population in terms of consumption, nor had it laid a
healthy foundation for future growth.

On the eve of reform,

the Chinese economy was on the verge of collapse.

A

principal reason for the deterioration of the Chinese
economy was the massive waste of resources on industrial
development in inland locations.

During the Third Front,

for example, over a billion yuan was spent on a large-scale
integrated steel mill at Jiuquan in Gansu Province, a plant
that finally was able to produce only a modest quantity of
pig iron {Naughton 1991, 246).

By the end of the 1970s,

Chinese planners were struggling with hundreds of
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unworkable, misdesigned, or incomplete projects.

According

to Barry Naughton's estimate, more than half of the
additional output created by economic growth between 1953
and 197 8 was either completely wasted, spent on the
military, or tied up by the inefficiencies of the economic
system (Naughton 1991, 248) .
The pre-reform regional economic policy was aimed at
promoting regional income equality, but was not successful.
It was able to prevent the escalation of regional income
disparity, but at a huge cost.

The pre-reform regional

economic policy was to blame for a massive waste of China's
limited resources, which eroded the Chinese economy.

The

policy left China with more negative than positive legacies.
The pro-coast regional economic policy implemented from
the end of 1978 through the early 1990s utilized economies
of agglomeration and stimulated national growth.

Real

national income rose from ah annual average of 6 percent
during the 1952-1978 period (Linge and Forbes 1990, 1) to 9
percent from 1979 through 1993 (Naughton 1995, 329).

Not

only did the Eastern Region grow rapidly, but the Central
and Western Regions grew as well (Table 15).

Surprisingly,

the policy did not cause immediate increase in regional
income inequality, which actually declined in the early
reform era (I define the early reform era as the period from

1978 to 1993).

This was primarily due to rapid growth in

previously less developed provinces (Guangdong, Fujian,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, etc) in the Eastern Region, and the slow
growth of the three municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing, and
Tianjin, and the northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang,
Jilin, and Liaoning--the traditional industrial bases.
According to Deng Xiaoping, the reform process is highy
experiemental, just like "crossing the river by groping for
stones".

Reform should start in the provinces of Guangdong

and Fujian, which are far from the traditional industrial
bases, but close to Hong Kong and Taiwan because even if the
experiment failed, the important industrial cities and
provinces would not be affected.

While state and foreign

investment boosted the economy of Guangdong and Fujian,
local industrial investment in village and township
enterprises stimulated the growth of Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
Meanwhile, the old industrial bases were growing at a
relatively slow pace due to the lack of investment and the
obsolescence of traditional industries.
The reduced regional income disparity in the reform era
in no way implies that the new regional economic policy
tends to improve the situation of regional economic
inequalities.

Provincial income inequality was likely to

rise after the early 1990s when the Chinese economy began to
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accelerate toward a free market.

The automatic working of

the market tends to reinforce the existing regional income
inequality.

Moreover, the central government has shifted

its attention from the southern provinces of Guangdong and
Fujiang to Shanghai since 1990.

Shanghai, with its rich

experience in finance, trade, industrial development, large
inflows of state and foreign investments, and quality
supplies of human resources, has been developing at an
incredible speed.

Though the three northeastern provinces

are still lagging behind, Shanghai's growth will tend to
enlarge the development gap between the Eastern Region and
the Central and Western Regions.
Though no prediction can be made with confidence due to
the lack of data, it is likely that regional economic
inequalities will remain a long-term phenomenon in China.
According to Harry Richardson, spread effects will not be
created around a growth pole in the early years of its
implementation, and very long time horizons are needed for a
successful strategy (Richardson 197 6, 1).
The choice between growth and equality as reflected in
China's regional economic policy is a result of both
prevailing development philosophy and politics.

The pro

interior regional economic policy responded to egalitarian
values and China's perceived needs for national defense.
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The pro-coast regional economic policy was designed to
replace the pro-interior policy because of the failure of
the pro-interior policy, the influence of Western
development theories and experience, and Deng Xiaoping's
philosophy of uneven regional development.
The pro-coast policy stimulated economic growth, but it
could not guarantee a harmony of interests among the
regions.

The inland provinces have already voiced their

discontent by bargaining with the central government for
more favorable policies, and by prohibiting the outflow of
raw materials to the Eastern Region.

The latter is called

"economic warlordism" (Jiang 1992; Shen and Dai 1990), or
"local protectionism", which is a direct spatial outcome of
the new regional economic policy.

Local protectionism is

highly detrimental to the economy as a whole, and will tend
to worsen the situation of spatial economic inequalities.
The dissatisfaction expressed by the leaders of the
inland provinces and continuous ethnic conflicts in the
border provinces intensified the fear of disintegration of
the nation.

Consequently, the regional economic policy of

China's Ninth Five-Year-Plan (1995-2000) deviates from that
in the 1980s and the early 1990s— uneven regional
development is to be corrected rather than tolerated.
Narrowing the regional gap of development and promoting
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regional economic coordination constitute one of the nine
main objectives of the Ninth Five-Year-Plan.

The central

government promises to increase investment in the Central
and Western Regions.

The Ninth Five-Year-Plan no longer

refers to the three economic regions, but advocates large
economic regions that are held together by "central cities",
a Chinese version of growth poles.
The Chinese government has again made a choice between
growth and equality.

The above adjustments to China's

regional economic policy reflect the prevailing criticisms
of the pro-coast regional economic policy as well as the
political complexities of China.
This study evaluates data only until 1993.

As is

obvious, when data for later years become available, it
would be beneficial to analyze the most recent situation of
regional income inequality in China.

Moreover, a study of

interregional inequality in consumption will be helpful to
an overall understanding of regional economic inequalities^
Regional consumption inequality is more related to people's
living standards than regional income inequality already
examined in this study.
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